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This research departs from conventional studies of citizen’s attitudes to parliament by utilising 
focus groups to interrogate the incredibly low levels of trust in Ukraine’s parliament during the 
Yanukovych and Poroshenko presidencies and explores how far they are related to the 
exceptionally high levels of disruptive protest in the chamber. Low trust is shaped primarily by 
citizens’ concerns about corruption, particularly the role of FIGs and of deputies’ rapacious 
and lawless behaviour (bezpredel). Disruptive protests were largely seen as inauthentic. Low 
trust was accompanied by support for democracy. 
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“We call [the Rada] - zrada [betrayal]” 
“Yes, the Supreme Betrayal” 
Focus group D 
 
Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council) is one of the world’s most disrupted parliaments 
and among the most mistrusted. Do spectacular and routinised protests inside the parliament 
help explain, even partially, such low levels of trust? Or might such disruptions be perceived 
by citizens as part of the representative process, particularly during periods of attempted 
authoritarian consolidation? Or perhaps such protests are so routinised that citizens do not 
attend to them much at all, and their confidence in parliament is shaped by other factors? 
Exploring citizens’ perceptions of these parliamentary disruptions offers a path to illuminate 
broader dimensions of the representative relationship between elites and citizens, interrogating 
how citizens make sense of it, which can have profound consequences for the legitimacy of the 
2 
 
political system. This analysis of original focus group data suggests that citizens’ deep 
cynicism of deputies and the Verkhovna Rada in general were largely independent of their 
levels of knowledge about its’ activities. Disruptions were mostly understood as inauthentic 
performances for selfish or rapacious motives. Disruptive protests were not the most noticed 
feature of parliament: participants were more concerned about deputies’ ties to big business 
and their corrupt and lawless behaviour (bezpredel), both inside parliament and beyond it. This 
concern left many participants feeling alienated from the current (as well as previous) 
authorities, but simultaneously seemed to confirm their support for greater democracy and the 
transparency and accountability it could bring. 
Parliamentary Disruption and Representation 
Comparative research suggests the meanings of parliamentary disruption are multiple and 
countervailing. It can be a means to make representative claims, to render the marginalised less 
marginal, to signal to and mobilise constituents, to perform and resist authoritarian domination 
and contribute to regime de-legitimation (Rai 2013; Spary 2013; Greene 2013; Whitmore 
2019). Disruption can also indicate the inability of the parliament to regulate conflict (Gandrud 
2012) and, if routinised, undermine its ability to perform important representative and symbolic 
functions (Spary 2013, 403, 409). On this basis, we expect that disruptions are likely to elicit 
the support of the principle actors’ core constituents, but to have a negative effect on the 
perception of parliament by a wider audience.1  
However, there are some problems with investigating this. Firstly, it is very difficult to 
disentangle the effects of parliamentary disruption on citizens’ perceptions of parliament from 
that of other aspects of its functioning. Furthermore, the contemporary era is one marked by 
sharp decline in popular trust in parliaments (Norris 2011, 102; Armingeon and Guthmann 
2014), with the post-Soviet cases worst affected (Dimitrova-Grazl and Simon 2010). At the 
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same time, corruption perceptions have a significant impact on trust in political institutions, 
with high corruption leading to low confidence in post-communist states (Pellegata and 
Memoli 2015). However, we still know little about how this shapes the ways in which they 
perceive the representative relationship. Secondly, an inherent tension exists between the 
performative, public dimensions of legislative activity and the necessity of key decision-
making taking place ‘off-stage’, which informs citizens’ perceptions of their parliament. This 
disjuncture leads people to feel that the real parliament is hidden from them, with plenary 
debates being staged diversions, evoking the sense that parliament is defective even where it is 
highly effective (Patzelt 2006). Thirdly, if scholars have been subject to criticism for 
unrealistically simplified conceptions of representation that overemphasise voter ‘demands’ 
and policy ‘outputs’ which obfuscate its dynamic and iterative nature and more significant 
symbolic functions (Wahkle 1971, 145), then we also need to interrogate vernacular 
understandings of the representative relationship. So, although we must be sensitive to the 
particularities of the Ukrainian case – which is distinguished by exceptionally low trust in 
parliament over time – the comparative difficulties of representation in the contemporary era 
are a salient backdrop to inform our interpretation of citizens’ perceptions.     
Representation should not be conceived as a static state of affairs achieved by periodic 
elections, but as “a dynamic process of claim-making and the reception of claims” (Saward 
2010, 8) which is intrinsically performative. This definition focuses on what representation 
does, not what it is, and on the effects of its invocation rather than its institutional embodiment 
(Saward 2010, 4). A repertoire of performances is employed by actors (in this case, 
parliamentary deputies) to make representative claims and affect their audience. As Parkinson 
explains, “claim-making is always directed at an audience, persuading others to think 
something or do something”. He proceeds to break down this process according to Aristotle’s 
categories of rhetorical proof: 
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…the aim is to convince the audience you are right (logos), to engage their emotions 
on your side (pathos) and to convince them of your good character (ethos) … at the 
expense of your opponents (2012, 44) 
For claim-making, actors can choose to use the formal legislative tools of re-presentation (e.g. 
making a speech, initiating a draft law, asking a parliamentary question) or they can choose to 
disrupt parliamentary proceedings with protest performances that seek to persuade the audience 
through logos, pathos and ethos.  
Parliamentary protest always involves making a representative claim. Even where the primary 
audience is other elites (most often the executive and/or parliamentary majority), the 
assumption of a wider audience who are not physically present in the space shapes the mode 
of performance given (Rai and Reinhelt 2015, 160; Parkinson 2012, 43). Performances directly 
or implicitly invoke ‘the people’ or a particular constituency on whose behalf the claim is made, 
alongside claims about the justifiability of the unconventional mode of protest. Furthermore, 
claim-making requires an audience to hear/see the performance and for that audience to 
understand it and accept, reject or modify the claim being made (Moffitt 2016, 104-5; Saward 
2010, 48-56), so citizens have agency in shaping the process, although the power relationship 
is heavily skewed.  
As parliamentary disruption is so widespread in Ukraine, it is worthy of investigating further 
to explore dimensions of the relationship between citizens and the state. In political science, 
our understanding of citizens’ attitudes to parliament are lacking in the sense that we know a 
great deal about the (generally declining) levels of trust across space and time, whilst still being 
unsure about their meaning and implications (Armingeon and Guthmann 2014, 428-30), its 
effect on support for democracy (Collins and Gambrel 2017) or its effect on political 
participation or compliance (Levi and Stoker 2000, 486-495). A small-scale qualitative case 
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study cannot aspire to answer definitively these questions, but it can probe deeply and identify 
fruitful avenues for further research. That Ukrainians have an exceptionally low opinion of 
their parliament is well-documented, but we don’t know how this distrust is constructed. To 
what extent is it based on awareness of specific parliamentary activities over time? Or is it a 
more general impression generated from media snippets about deputies’ lavish lifestyles, 
laziness or disruptive, even violent, behaviour? Do more informed citizens have a better 
impression of parliament? Do citizens notice the range of disruptive protests staged in 
parliament – and if so, how do they perceive them and what can this tell us about the process 
of representation? To answer these questions, the broader context of Ukraine’s parliament and 
its disruptive practices will be introduced, before discussing the method of investigation. The 
empirical analysis and discussion will proceed thematically, prior to drawing some tentative 
conclusions. 
Distrustful Citizens and Parliament in Ukraine  
Ukrainian citizens do not hold their state institutions in high regard. Longitudinal survey data 
from multiple sources produces an unambiguous picture of widespread distrust. For example, 
for 2013-2016 negative levels of trust were evident across all main state institutions (including 
the president, parliament, government, courts, procuracy, security services, bureaucracy, 
police), except the army and patrol police.2 Outstanding in this regard is the absolute lack of 
trust in the parliament which consistently had a much lower trust rating than the president or 
government in the post-Soviet period (see table 1).3 Parliamentary trust ratings recovered 
briefly in the wake of the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2013-14 Euromaidan revolution as 
popular expectations rose, but then in both cases rapidly fell below the previous nadir, so that 
by 2016 the Rada’s overall trust rating was a staggering -69.2% (though courts and state 
bureaucracy fared even worse) and approval ratings followed a similar trajectory (Razumkov, 
2012, 16). Compared even with other post-Soviet parliaments, this was remarkable.4  There 
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was rather minimal variation by age, region, sex, income or size of settlement5 but a 2010 
survey indicated deputies’ corruption, their inability to take decisions for the development of 
the country and the dependence on the interests of big business as the top three reasons 
underlying this distrust, as well as identifying higher levels of distrust among Kyiv residents 
(my sample).6 Therefore, I expect widespread distrust and suspicion among focus group 
participants, but such ratings are rather a blunt instrument, generally measured on a 5-point 
Likert scale. Trust is important to the representative relationship but it can imply a 
straightforward principal-agent relationship which is problematically simplistic in that it 
generates misleading expectations about what that relationship might entail. At the same time, 
such a principal-agent conception is perhaps closest to the vernacular understanding of 
representation: citizens (the principal) choose via elections agents to represent their and the 
national interest(s) in decision-making. To probe how this vernacular perception is constructed, 
and to explore the role of parliamentary protest performances in the representative relationship, 
the main features of the Ukrainian political system, the main actors, the shifting repertoire of 
protest performances in the Rada and media coverage of these will be introduced.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Ukraine is most usefully conceived as a hybrid regime with pronounced neopatrimonial 
features. The president performs the role of ‘patron-in-chief’, while elite networks based on 
financial-industrial groups (FIGs), local political machines or certain resource-rich state 
institutions compete for access to rents (Hale 2015) and seek influence through forming 
political parties or factions in parliament (Matsuszak 2012), as well as through media 
ownership (Ryabinska 2017).7 Concomitantly, many deputies sought (or simply bought) a 
parliamentary seat primarily as a means to protect/promote their business interests (Wilson 
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2016, 9) and to acquire parliamentary immunity. This trend strengthened with each 
convocation so that by 2012 over 300 of 450 deputies were dollar millionaires (Razumkov 
Centre 2012, 11). Under president Yanukovych (2010-14), Ukraine’s parliament was 
dominated by Yanukovych’s Party of Regions (PRU) based on the networks of Donetsk 
billionaire Rinat Akhmetov and the so-called ‘Gas group’ around Dmytro Firtash and Serhiy 
L’yovochkhin (Matsuszak 2012). During 2010-14, the PRU formed a coalition with the small 
Communist faction, while the sizable (178 of 450 seats) opposition comprised imprisoned ex-
premier Yulia Tymoshenko’s Fatherland, ex-boxer Vitaly Klitchko’s UDAR (Punch) and the 
radical right Freedom party. Yanukovych’s attempted authoritarian consolidation during this 
time included downgrading the constitutional status of the parliament, as well as curbing 
judicial and media independence. The Euromaidan revolution, annexation of Crimea and war 
in Donbas prompted far-reaching party restructuring so the victors of the 2014 snap elections 
were hastily formed personalised electoral blocs around the new president (the eponymous 
Bloc of Petro Poroshenko (BPP), 146 seats), prime minister Yatseniuk (People’s Front, 83 
seats) and mayor of L’viv (Self-Reliance, 32 seats).  The new parliament (2014-19) was more 
fragmented and less polarised that its predecessor, and the lines between majority and 
opposition complex and blurred.  
Although the high frequency of parliamentary disruption in Ukraine since the 1990s has been 
noted, due to an absence of official recording and patchy media coverage, it is not possible to 
say that it was more or less frequent under Yanukovych or Poroshenko. What is much clearer 
is that the repertoire of protest performances changed: under Yanukovych, the sizable 
opposition often worked together, using more radical performances, particularly visual, 
somatic and auditory protest and rostrum-blocking, and combining them into large scale set-
piece spectacles in the president’s presence that symbolically challenged his legitimacy to rule 
(Whitmore 2019). Deputies justified such disruption as the only option available to resist the 
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regime’s authoritarian moves.8 Under Poroshenko, protest re-emerged in the death-throws of 
the oversized coalition in late 2015, but the repertoire evolved: spectacles and organised 
auditory disruption disappeared. Disruptive performances were most usually the recourse of 
the small, populist, ex-coalition parties, Fatherland and the Radical Party. Under both 
Yanukovych and Poroshenko (and indeed earlier), physically blocking the rostrum to prevent 
the conduct of parliamentary business was common, along with extensive use of banners, t-
shirts and other visual props around the chamber. Protests not infrequently boiled over into 
shoving and fisticuffs between deputies, occasionally blood was spilled (see Whitmore 2019).  
More radical and spectacular protests, along with violence, usually extended the total media 
coverage given to the parliament, as FIG-controlled media close to the president found this 
difficult to ignore and instead sought to portray the opposition as ‘uncivilised’, but more 
research is needed to investigate media coverage of parliament in Ukraine.9 Ukrainian media, 
particularly television and print media were dominated (in terms of audience share) by the same 
FIGs that sought influence through deputies and parties in parliament and whose non-
transparent ownership was motivated by the pursuit of political influence, not profit (Ryabinska 
2017). Although disruptive protests were widely covered by internet and print media, on the 
most important source of political information – television – coverage, like of opposition 
activities more generally, was more patchy, especially on the main four channels (Inter (Firtash 
and L’yovochkin), Ukraina (Akhmetov), 1+1 (Kolomoiskiy), ICTV (Pinchuk).10 Nevertheless, 
I expect that images of protesting deputies (whether on TV, newspapers or online) were more 
widely noticed by citizens than speeches and law-making plenary activities, but data collection 
must be designed to avert the risk of leading participants to overemphasise their importance in 




I conducted a series of four focus groups in Kyiv, 22-24 June 2016 with pre-existing social 
groups based on workplace and/or friendship (see table 2).11 This is sufficient to tap into a 
range of perceptions of protest performances and the parliament more widely, although with 
greater resources, the scope of the findings could have been enhanced by holding more focus 
groups in other regions of Ukraine and with pensioners, a significant social group not 
represented in this research. Using pre-existing social groups permitted the incorporation of 
varied social groups (students, professionals, entrepreneurs, skilled service personnel and 
office workers) and facilitated a generally relaxed atmosphere. A pitfall of this research method 
reduced control over the composition of the groups. In particular, men were significantly 
unrepresented among the participants (see table 2). Nevertheless, longitudinal survey data show 
trust in parliament in Ukraine varies little along key variables, including gender (see above),12 
so while the focus groups cannot claim to be representative, they do allow some access to the 
attitudes underlying the confidence levels, and the limited variation in surveys on key 
indicators undergirds claims of validity in the findings.  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Focus groups are particularly useful for this research because of the anticipated low levels of 
interest and/or knowledge about the topic. In such cases, interaction with people with whom 
participants are likely to have discussed politics previously was expected to yield richer 
discussions, by giving participants opportunities to form their opinions through interaction, by 
responding to other’s positions, as well as enabling Ukrainian citizens to shape the agenda of 
the research by providing opportunities to raise issues they see as significant (Bryman 2004, 
348). Due to fears about under-recruitment, because I was interested in the extent of citizens’ 
awareness of protest performances in the Rada and to enhance the naturalistic nature of the 
interactions by reducing opportunities to ‘prepare’, participants were told during recruitment 
that the focus group was about their opinions of Ukrainian politics. To generate discussion, 
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broad open questions about the parliament were asked at the outset, before funnelling into 
questions about protest performances, using photographs and video clips as prompts (see 
Appendix 1). The discussions on protests tended to quickly drift to more general comments on 
the activities of the Rada or individual deputies. I conducted preliminary open coding of 
transcripts while simultaneously listening to the audio recordings, permitting the identification 
of the extensiveness and intensity of the comments and themes (Kruger 1998, p.31-8) as well 
as the ‘big ideas’ percolating through each focus group and across groups which are perhaps 
not reducible to specific quotations (Kruger 1998, 35-6). Multiple themes and responses were 
initially mapped visually, before being grouped into five main categories, each housing sub-
categories. Individual comments and exchanges were then manually coded a second time, 
followed by emotion coding and versus coding (Saldaña 2009, 86-7, 94-5) to probe 
participants’ underlying assumptions and self-positioning in relation to parliament. Therefore, 
the data permits insights into citizens’ perceptions of the Rada more broadly and facilitates 
some preliminary interrogation of the exceptionally low levels of public confidence in the 
parliament and the broader relationship between Ukraine’s highest representative body and 
citizens.  
Attitudes to the Verkhovna Rada 
As expected, generalised distrust and negative attitudes towards deputies predominated as 
citizens expressed their first associations with the Rada. “Lobbying” was the word immediately 
heard in all four focus groups, closely followed by “corruption”, then expressions that graded 
a spectrum of terms for performative spectacle shading into uncivilised conduct: circus, 
scandals, menagerie, fighting, chaos. Participants were palpably disappointed that the new 
Rada was seemingly much like its predecessor, and felt cheated after Euromaidan raised their 
hopes that systemic change could be achieved (groups B, C, D). The main themes that emerged 
were a perception of disruptive protest as inauthentic performances that sought to mask the 
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corrupt influence of FIGs and deputies’ avaricious and lawless behaviour (bezpredel). 
Understandings of disruption as genuine protest, as making a representative claim were present, 
but scarce. To contextualise these perceptions, I first examine participants’ levels of 
engagement with parliament and their awareness of examples of disruptive performances.   
Citizens’ Engagement with Parliamentary Activity 
Levels of political engagement and awareness about parliamentary activity varied considerably 
in all but focus group A (where engagement was, predictably, high among social science 
postgraduates). Six participants (in B, C) reported that the Euromaidan revolution had 
transformed their attitude to politics and politicised them. At the other end of the spectrum 
were individuals who evinced utter disinterest in politics and parliament, and from their 
contributions it was clear their knowledge was based on their rather tenuous, sceptical 
engagement with election campaigns, Euromaidan and TV news stories (9 of 11 participants 
of group D fit into this category, but only 1 or 2 from B and C). In both groups C and D there 
were 1-2 highly engaged individuals that followed politics, and parliament, closely ‘like a soap 
opera’ (Aleksandr, group C), while the remainder were in between the two extremes, and 
included those politicised by their participation in Euromaidan.   
The extent to which participants noticed parliamentary protests was, unsurprisingly, strongly 
correlated with their overall levels of political engagement. They were asked about five specific 
examples of disruptions under Yanukovych and Poroshenko between 2010 and 2016. Many 
had not heard about or seen some of the most radical and spectacular protests that took place 
under Yanukovych, but the way this was patterned also belied the spotty coverage of opposition 
activities on the main TV channels.13 Participants were shown a clip of the protest that turned 
into mass disorder intended to prevent the ratification of the Kharkhiv Accords in 2010. This 
controversial agreement extended the lease of the Sevastopol’ base to the Russian military until 
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2049 in exchange for cheaper gas. During this protest, eggs and smoke bombs were thrown and 
equipment broken as hundreds of deputies shoved and fought in a generalised melee (see 
Shukan 2013). Most focus group participants had not heard about or could not recall this protest 
(one participant each in groups C and D, none in A14, but all in group B remembered vividly 
(see below)), so despite the protest’s extreme nature, its impact on participants was limited. 
Similarly, the regular parliamentary protest (but not the extra-parliamentary tent camp in 
downtown Kyiv) of the “Free Yulia” campaign against the politically-motivated imprisonment 
of opposition party leader Yulia Tymoshenko bypassed the majority of respondents. These 
repeated spectacles were performed during 2011-2013 at parliamentary plenary sessions that 
the president was obliged to attend, and involved over 100 deputies wearing matching t-shirts 
and waving banners emblazoned with Tymoshenko’s face, chanting “Free Yulia” or “Shame”. 
In one case they prevented Yanukovych from delivering his annual address to parliament.15 
However, media coverage of these spectacles was patchy, as although they were covered 
extensively by internet and print media, television coverage was less fulsome, especially on 
the main channels.16  
In contrast, the contemporaneous routine football-hooligan-style chanting of “[Speak] 
Ukrainian!” by the radical right Freedom party during 2012-14 every time a deputy spoke in 
Russian during the plenary session had attracted the attention of most participants, so wide 
media coverage of this can be inferred. And almost everyone knew about the sustained “Vote 
Personally” protest organised by the opposition factions in parliament in early 2013 in which 
the three opposition factions blocked the rostrum and speakers’ dais round-the-clock for almost 
two months, using eye-catching visual props (banners, stickers, t-shirts). This performance was 
the culmination of a sustained campaign by NGOs to end so-called “piano voting”, the 
widespread and unconstitutional practice of deputies voting for up to 7-8 of their colleagues. 
The pincer movement of civil society and opposition factions combined with the impossibility 
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of the new parliament holding sessions for so long made it very difficult for television to ignore, 
especially when internet sources covered it so fully, so that into the second month of the protest, 
the issue of piano-voting, the opposition protest, and opposition politicians were gaining 
extensive coverage on the main channels.17 
There was greater awareness about disruptive protests under Poroshenko, despite their less 
spectacular nature. For example, the Radical Party’s chanting of “Shame!” to President 
Poroshenko on his controversial appointment of Yuriy Lutsenko as Procurator General in May 
2016 was noticed by almost half of participants and a majority were aware of the same party’s 
sustained blocking of the rostrum accompanied by visual protest (banners on and behind the 
speaker’s dias) to demand a parliamentary investigation into elites’ off-shore accounts ongoing 
at the time the focus groups were conducted. Notably though, the postgraduate students in 
group A did not know about it, reporting that they ‘turned off’ to any news involving Oleh 
Liashko, the Radical Party’s populist leader. Explanations for participants’ better knowledge 
of these protests include the recentness of these events together with the after effects of 
Euromaidan in terms of greater media freedom and the increased interest of participants in 
politics. In the main, varying levels of political engagement and knowledge did not prevent the 
vast majority of participants from articulating defined positions about the Rada and deputies’ 
disruptive protests.  
Disruption as Genuine Protest 
Emphatically, it was a fringe position in every focus group to regard parliamentary disruptions 
as genuine protests undertaken for justifiable reasons. Nevertheless, such opinions were voiced 
in all groups, though with variation in which protests individuals saw as legitimate. 
Significantly, those protests seen as authentic occurred under Yanukovych, often where 
participants sympathised with the opposition’s and parliament’s political marginalisation at 
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that time. The mass violent disorder in the plenary chamber intending to prevent the ratification 
of the Kharkhiv Accords provoked the most visceral reactions: 
Anastastia, 25: It was extremely important. If I was in parliament on that day, I would 
also do something like that (A) 
 
Tatiana, 48: It was real treason. It was Yanukovych’s biggest betrayal of Ukraine…  
From today’s perspective, on [this issue] it was probably already necessary to start 
shooting … 
Viktoriya, 54: It is [their] internal powerlessness, as if they can somehow defend… 
Olga, 48: …It was acceptable then. Well, what could they do if they didn’t use force?  
(B) 
These participants agreed with the opposition’s position on the substantive issue of Kharkhiv 
Accords – that the agreement was unconstitutional and a threat to Ukraine’s sovereignty – and 
also accepted the procedural argument that its ratification was illegitimate as it was railroaded 
through parliament with blatant violations of the standing orders.18 In such circumstances, the 
violent, militarised disruption (smoke bombs, eggs, fistfights) was justified to (try to) 
physically prevent the agreement’s ratification. One of the key organisers of the protest 
explained “such methods are a last resort to defend the fundamental foundations of [Ukrainian] 
statehood under threat”.19 So a minority of participants were persuaded by logos, but also 
pathos in this act. The battlefield-like scenes intensified in them the sense of the threat to 
Ukrainian sovereignty and they accepted the opposition playing the role of brave defenders, 
willing to risk physically injury and legal sanction20 for this cause.  
 
There was a clear partisan dimension to these responses, and it is unsurprising that declared 
opponents of Yanukovych and supporters of Maidan were more accommodating of radical 
15 
 
forms of disorder directed at the previous president. In the case of the united opposition’s 
prolonged campaign against non-personal voting which blocked the work of parliament for two 
months, a slight majority of participants supported the protest, in line with nationwide survey 
findings at the time of the action. However, survey figures rose to 74.4%-85.4% among 
opposition voters,21 demonstrating that this action successfully communicated to opposition 
constituents that they were advancing a necessary claim on behalf of Ukrainian society and 
evoked hope for positive change within the Rada at the time (see below). This protest, 
especially by new forces in the parliament (UDAR, Freedom) helped to demonstrate opposition 
deputies’ good character and intensions to voters.22 
 
 Even without supporting Tymoshenko, there was recognition that the ‘Free Yulia’ spectacles 
staged to humiliate Yanukovych in parliament had a place in the Rada during that period: 
Tatiana, 48: They did not sit silent and afraid as [the authorities] expected after 
Tymoshenko was imprisoned. [The authorities] were counting on this 
Olga, 48: It is their leader, they are defending their interests. It is a sign of democracy, 
bold democracy at the time (B) 
 
Iryna, 21: …then there was like this total anti-Yanukovych movement… it was on that 
wave of what was happening (A) 
So, some Ukrainians read radical disruptions as manifestations of democracy, as a legitimate 
means to resist authoritarian and illegal moves undertaken by the Yanukovych regime,23 and 
as an expression of the opposition’s powerlessness in the face of widespread parliamentary and 
other legal or procedural violations by the authorities to dominate the political space: 
16 
 
Anna, 21: When parliament members couldn’t influence … in Yanukovych’s time, it 
was a bit justifiable, because they did something, even if it was for TV they did 
something… (A) 
These protests sought to evoke pathos and ethos, primarily being psychological appeals aiming 
to create the sense of a brave and united team performing defiance of Yanukovych’s 
unconstitutional actions. The logical arguments (logos) about the political motivation 
underlying Tymoshenko’s imprisonment were made separately in other fora. These 
parliamentary spectacles were intended to continually make her imprisonment as emotionally 
uncomfortable as possible for Yanukovych. He risked public humiliation24 in front of 
diplomats, deputies and, via the media, a wider audience of citizens. Although these 
performances may not have persuaded Ukrainian audiences of the correctness of the claim, the 
data shows how such acts resonated with potential constituents, who felt such behaviour was 
justified in the circumstances and, like Tatiana and Olga, saw bravery and resistance in this.  
 
Most, however, were more reserved, acknowledging the correctness of one or two of the claims 
(personal voting or speaking Ukrainian in parliament) (A, B, C, D) but not the means, believing 
more conventional, rule-bound methods (leading by example; street protests) were appropriate 
(A), that such protests were ineffective (A, D) or conducted for personal or political gains (see 
below).  
 
In general, deputies’ disruptive protests do not seem to be an effective means of persuading a 
wider audience of their claims, but they had some, albeit limited, success in convincing core 
constituents that they were acting correctly, perhaps bravely, and articulating a legitimate claim 
in the context of attempted authoritarian consolidation. In other instances, deputies’ 
performances were accepted as advancing a just claim by a wider audience, but citizens rejected 
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the unconventional methods used to make it. However, it was evident that deputies’ 
persuasiveness on specific claims – their ability to advance convincing rational arguments 
(logos) and make emotional appeals (pathos) was significantly hampered by the audiences’ 
rejection of their source credibility or ethos. Rather, participants’ perception of deputies’ 
untrustworthiness suggested that citizens remained very suspicious about the motivations for 
parliamentary disruption and were more likely to understand it as self-serving.  
 
Inauthentic Performances 
The inauthenticity of deputies’ performances was the most pronounced theme when citizens 
were asked about parliamentary disruption, but was not confined to it, as participants raised 
numerous examples outside of disruptions, revealing attitudes to the Rada more generally. This 
was the dominant theme in focus groups B and C, though featured less prominently in A and 
D. Two distinct dimensions emerged from the discussions – that disruptive protests were 
regarded as pokazukha (for show) or zakazukha (an ordered performance).25 The general 
scepticism and frequent cynicism towards deputies’ actions was encapsulated by Veronika (41, 
C): “I can’t call this protest. For me it is a circus, a show”. Part of our task is to tease out how 
far such perceptions arise from widespread beliefs in deputies’ corruption.  
 
The idea that parliamentary disruptions were inauthentic, performed by deputies not out of 
conviction, but for personal or political gain was shared by all participants, including those 
who saw certain protests as genuine. Variously, protests were described as a circus, a show or 
theatre (A, B, C, D). Ascribed motivations for such performances centred around either a 
political or financial dividend. I subsume the political motive under the sub-category of 
pokazukha: Participants felt that such activities were primarily seeking media attention (A, C) 
and aimed to score “political points” by signalling their opinion on an issue (A, B, C, D). For 
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example, the Radical Party’s rostrum-blocking to demand an investigation into officials’ off-
shore accounts elicited scorn and charges of hypocrisy: 
Yulia, 28: Nothing will change because no-one wants to touch off-shores. They all have 
[them]. 
Galina, 59: …probably Liashko also has money there. We don’t believe in this protest. 
It is pokazukha. (D) 
Similar sentiments were shared across all groups about Oleh Liashko and this protest. 
Participants did not see themselves as the main target constituents for the Radical Party’s 
populist style. Some (C, D) saw such performances as primarily orientated towards the older, 
rural and, by implication, less educated population, and “for those with fewer shows in life” 
(Olia, 37, C). Thus, participants implicitly engaged in a hierarchical stratification of Ukrainian 
society, even in cases where they confessed to being ill-informed about politics themselves. 
They saw themselves as astute observers but were fearful that large sections of the population 
were susceptible to manipulation by “populists”, the slick, well-heeled entrepreneurs 
pretending to be “of the people” (A, B, C, D). Further research is needed to investigate how 
rural, older citizens position themselves in relation to such “shows” as aggregate data suggests 
minimal variation in levels of trust in parliament according to age and settlement size. 
 
Even the protest known to have elicited majority popular support at the time – the 2013 “Vote 
Personally” campaign - in hindsight evoked cynicism and suspicion of hypocrisy. The students 
questioned the motivation of those protesting, noting those individuals had almost certainly 
had voted for other deputies on occasion (A). The ethical correctness of the cause was generally 
acknowledged - deputies should vote personally according to the Constitution (A, B, C, D) so 
the fact that deputies who protested in 2013 and new deputies considered moral authorities 
were not voting personally in 2016 contributed to a thoroughgoing sense of inauthenticity and 
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betrayal. This example highlights the importance of the temporal dimension to representative 
relationship. Claims can be accepted by a constituency and a wider audience at one point in 
time, but rejected later.    
 
A second dimension to the idea that parliamentary disruption was inauthentic performance was 
zakazukha, the notion that such protests were ordered by extra-parliamentary actors, in 
particular FIGs. Although participants were primarily referring to the Radical Party in the 
current convocation, there was the sense that this was a broader phenomenon: 
Vlad, 23: [speaking about Fatherland’s “Free Yulia” spectacles during 2011-13] There 
is an opinion that such pickets and actions are made when there is a law that they want 
to pass that will not be good for society and by these actions they close the process and 
[shift] the attention of society to another site (A) 
So, in complete contrast to the Maidan supporters who saw the “Free Yulia” protests as 
legitimate resistance to authoritarian consolidation, here it is regarded as a cynical attempt to 
distract attentive audiences’ away from rent-seeking legislation. As well as acting as a 
diversion, disruptive practices were interpreted as a forum in which competition between FIGs 
was conducted. The Radical party was reported to be funded by the former Party of Regions 
FIGs of Dmytro Firtash (initially) and Rinat Akhmetov (latterly).26 So citizens saw the party’s 
leader Oleh Liashko as a “political prostitute” doing his master’s bidding (B). One such 
example was the Radical Party’s audible disruption of the president’s (legally dubious) 
appointment of Yuriy Lutsenko as Prosecutor General by chanting ‘Shame!’ during 
Poroshenko’s speech:   
Olga, 48: [Liashko] was told “Humiliate Poroshenko!” so he humiliated Poroshenko. It 
is a struggle between Firtash and Poroshenko. 
Tatiana, 48: It is the struggle of the oligarchs. (B) 
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The Radical Party’s use of the repertoire of parliamentary disruption was understood as just 
one of the instruments available to FIGs to distract media and thus popular attention from their 
self-interested acts that required a legislative imprimatur. The most notable stunt of Liashko 
was his attempt to take a cow into parliament (C), which was subsequently identified as a 
zakazukha ordered by L’yovochkin timed to distract media attention from Tymoshenko’s court 
case.27  
 
So broadly, parliamentary disruption was recognised by citizens as staged performance, largely 
disconnected from deputies’ ‘real’ political views that was primarily aimed at self-promotion 
or PR (pokazukha) or as a paid, sometimes diversionary, tactic to further the interests of the 
FIGs that stand behind parliamentary actors (zakazukha). The ideas of inauthenticity and 
especially zakazukha are rooted in citizens’ broader conception of parliament as primarily a 
place for rapacious elites to enrich themselves at the expense of society.  
 
Corruption and Lobbying 
Deputies’ corruption28 was the meta-theme that ran like a red thread through the focus group 
discussions and in most cases seemed to be the foundation stone on which other opinions of 
parliament’s functioning were built. This builds on the 2010 survey that put deputies’ 
corruption and dependence on big business as two of the three main reasons for citizen’s 
distrust in the Rada29 and enables its interrogation. When asked about parliamentary disruption, 
many participants rapidly drifted to commenting on various facets of lobbying and corruption 
which can be divided into two sub-categories: deputies acting as agents of FIGs and deputies’ 




The sense that deputies were primarily dependent on and engaged in lobbying on behalf of 
FIGs was a predominant theme. For example: 
Tatiana, 48: They all lobby someone’s interests. …[T]here is information that Rinat 
Akhmetov already took 20-25 deputies there to personally support the passing of laws 
[in his interests…]. Exactly the same with Firtash and all the oligarchs… 
Emma, 46: We understand all this… Now we look at them and know who they are 
representing. (B)  
In this and other discussions there was a strong sense of the failure of substantial elite change 
after Maidan to match societies’ progression (B, C). Participants felt now able to see through 
elites’ games to their underlying interests. These underlying networks were identified as a 
fundamental barrier to democratic development in Ukraine (B, C, D) because, as Ihor (C) 
articulated: “our oligarchy is very strongly interested in maintaining the status-quo in these 
shadow schemes”. These resilient social connections explained the difficulties Ukraine 
experienced in forming viable anti-corruption agencies, and legislating judicial and other 
progressive reforms: 
Ihor, 42: In Ukraine there is no real opposition. It is all people from big capital, from 
oligarchs, and some of them are playing the role of the authorities and some of them – 
the ersatz opposition. But they are part of the same views, the same political system, 
periodically changing places. In essence nothing changes…because [parliament] is full 
of people who [play] for the cameras during plenary sessions, neglect their duties and 
decisions are all made in the so-called ‘agreed places’ – in restaurants, in saunas or at 
[social] gatherings… [where] they simply appropriate [deribanit’]. (C) 
So, contrary to academic research that suggested ‘oligarchs’ were not the main power-brokers 
in Ukraine (Pleines 2016), participants felt that their influence was the decisive one (and they 
tended to include Poroshenko into this category – as an oligarch first, and president second (B, 
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C, D)). Moreover, in Ihor’s vision there is a strong evocation of Patzelt’s (2006) concerns about 
citizens’ sense of the plenary session as theatrics and real decision-making as hidden, but 
participants went further to insinuate that such decision-making was primarily about the 
misallocation of state resources to FIG interests, and the performance a carefully 
choreographed one to mimic democracy. This idea emerged in other focus groups: 
Olena, 37 [shouting, exasperated]: They make their business there [in parliament]! Ask 
all the millionaires how they made their millions…how they fought for that, how they 
beat people’s faces [in plenary sessions]. Right? [sighs] (D)  
As well as working for FIGs, citizens explained that deputies had the patronage resources and 
scope to pursue their personal and commercial interests too (B,C,D):  
Ihor, 42: The main thing is to understand which financial stream you should put your 
friends on (C) 
Therefore, some participants felt that deputies were only representing themselves and FIGs, 
not the interests of their constituents or the country, such as Olga (44, D) who, in frustration 
asked, “Who will lobby the interests of the country and not their personal interests?”. Olena 
and Olga’s cynicism about the representative process was thorough-going, and appeared to be 
rooted in personal negative experiences of the corruption of the electoral process under 
Yanukovych.30 As Saward (2010, 86) explains, citizens’ view of elections will affect the 
strength of the representative claims made by deputies. By virtue of their election, 
representatives can claim to represent, but questionable electoral integrity is likely to affect this 
relationship profoundly from both sides. If a deputy effectively buys a seat (considered 
widespread practice in Ukraine), they are unlikely to feel strong obligations to either a party or 
a particular group of voters. If, like Olena and Olga, voters see the electoral process as reduced 
to a corrupt transaction, they are unlikely to see the elected deputies as credible, ethical or, 
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crucially, as their rightful representative. So, for some, individual life experiences were perhaps 
as important in forming opinions about parliament as media information.  
 
As citizens saw a parliamentary seat as an opportunity for personal enrichment, the Rada was 
seen as an institution that (through the influence of FIGS on parties and the conduct of elections 
(B, D)) attracted the morally degenerate. Participants in D spoke at length about deputies’ 
brazen marital infidelity, habitual dangerous driving, laziness (not attending plenary sessions, 
not learning Ukrainian31) and indecent attachment to luxurious material possessions. The fact 
that Yulia Tymoshenko, her Fatherland party (“former bandits” – Olga, 44, D) and Oleh 
Liashko were particularly singled out (A,B,C,D) for moral laxity in personal life in part reflects 
the prevalent bias on Ukraine’s main TV channels. For instance, a documentary purporting to 
reveal Liashko’s spacious mansion outside Kyiv, neighbouring some of the most odious Party 
of Regions deputies, had been shown on ICTV immediately prior to the focus groups and its 
content was recounted at length by participants (B, D). For others, it was primarily a rejection 
of the populist style of these party leaders (A, C). However, while Tymoshenko and Liashko 
might have been singled out for special mention, participants made clear they regarded the vast 
majority (sometimes all) of deputies as ethically corrupted (B, C, D), which had wide-reaching 
implications for their capacity and willingness to represent their constituents and behave 
appropriately (see below). If why the will might be lacking is self-evident, the capacity to 
represent is shaped by source credibility. Deputies who lack this will find it harder to make 
convincing, authentic claims. Overall, participants seemed to understand corruption and 
representation as an inverse relationship where if the representative is using their office for 
particularist gains, then logically they are not acting in constituents’ or the national interest 





Deputies’ moral taintedness meant that they did not share societies’ values and norms of 
behaviour, and this disconnect for some (B, D) explained the excess of parliamentary 
disruption, fisticuffs and other laxities (non-attendance, piano-voting, procedural violations). 
Bezpredel was an idea that emerged in all the focus groups, and was particularly prominent in 
B, C, and D. Literally, the word means “without limit”, but it is better rendered as “lawless”, 
“illicit” or, in political science terminology, normlessness.32 In contemporary usage in Ukraine 
it implies rule violations or lawless behaviour by state officials and ordinary citizens. Asking 
participants about parliamentary disruption and fighting could raise potential methodological 
issues by generating more discussion on bezpredel than if questions had been about, say, law-
making. However, I am confident that this is not the case because the term bezpredel (as well 
as examples of it) emerged spontaneously at the outset, when asked for their first associations 
with the words Verkhovna Rada, before participants knew the focus of the research was 
disruption. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that bezpredel and the associated behaviours 
grouped here include but – importantly - transcend the narrow confines of parliamentary 
disruption.  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, participants predominantly linked deputies’ lawless behaviour not to 
disruptive performances in plenary sessions (even though they were specifically asked about 
these) but to piano-voting, other habitual procedural violations, fighting and deputies’ general 
detachment from society. Nevertheless, more radical performances of disruption like the mass 
disorder to disrupt the ratification of the Kharkhiv Accords were understood as bezpredel, 
characterised as “a madhouse” (Anya, 21, A) and “unacceptable for the supreme legislative 
organ of a country” (Ihor, 42, D). These discussions in A and C were underpinned by normative 
ideas about democratic parliaments that reflected the educated status of participants and their 
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implicit comparisons with idealised visions of conduct in, for example, Westminster. Often 
explicitly, deputies’ behaviour was seen as a manifestation of Ukraine’s (C) or the individual 
deputies’ (D) cultural backwardness.33 Frequent fistfights and violent disorder were an 
extension of this deficiency where normless behaviour occurred literally due to the lack of 
limits on deputies in the form of rules and a lack of sanctions with teeth (A, C, D). For example, 
this exchange: 
Olia, 37: Well, it isn’t normal in any sense! 
Veronika: 41: I think that we need [a sergeant-at-arms] in the parliament. As many as 
possible. 
Olia, 37: 100%! 
Veronika, 41: There is no alternative if we will continue to play at being a democracy 
(B) 
Here it is clear that participants’ support for democracy had not been diminished by perceived 
failures of the incumbent or previous administrations or by deputies’ disruptive protests. The 
problem was one of insufficient democracy, which could curb such behavioural excesses by 
enforcing the democratic rules of the game.  
 
More often though, participants linked the problem of unconstrained behaviour to piano-voting 
and other rule violations during parliamentary sessions (A, C, D). Tetiana Chornovil, formerly 
a respected journalist who was brutally beaten during Euromaidan and subsequently elected to 
parliament aroused particular consternation when she was caught piano-voting (C, D). For 
example: 
Daryna, 24: …Tetiana Chornovil said that if [piano-voting] is for a good cause, [she] 
would do it anyway. But even if they want to abuse the law for good, it is still bad. (A). 
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Reflecting the overwhelming social consensus on this issue,34 all participants (A, B, C, D) saw 
piano-voting as wrong. As noted above, this practice had been the subject of sustained 
parliamentary protests in early 2013 that won changes to the parliamentary standing orders and 
made it politically unacceptable. However, piano-voting was resurgent after the 
reconfiguration of the coalition in April 2016 due to the narrowness of their parliamentary 
majority, so even deputies like Chornovil, who had hitherto been moral authorities justified 
this practice in the name of reforms. Citizens recognised that piano-voting occurred due to 
deputies’ poor attendance (A, B, C, D) which in turn evoked more consternation (B, D), 
cynicism and resignation (A, C). Taking decisions (passing laws) in conformity with formal 
rules of procedure is crucial for endowing those decisions with legitimacy (Beetham 2013, 16) 
and thus for the willingness of those subject to those decisions to comply with them (Easton 
1975, 447). Bezpredel theoretically thus opens almost every parliamentary decision to legal 
challenge. Furthermore, the regularity of rule violations devalues the importance of rule 
conformity for elites, engendering a vicious circle of normlessness and cynicism about rules, 
which threaten the integrity of the parliamentary institution itself. This process is empirically 
enmeshed in the broader patronal politics and the two are extremely difficult to distinguish 
analytically.  
 
Participants’ abhorrence of these practices underscored the chasm between citizens and 
parliamentarians’ perceptions of appropriate and acceptable parliamentary behaviour in the 
post-Maidan period. This perceived gap between deputies’ and citizens’ morals and logics of 
appropriateness was articulated by participants in their aforementioned stories of deputies’ 
bezpredel in private life, such as  
Olga, 44: …[T]hey were driving on the wrong side of the road. They crash through all 
the rules, understand? They make money, not thinking about the people. (D) 
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 So, for some participants, the most disgusting aspect of deputies’ behaviour was the 
accompanying sense of impunity as well as their detachment from society (B, D): 
Viktoriya, 57: For me it is corruption, money and also their utter nonchalance, their 
utter indifference [to society], to their problems, to how they live … They live in their 
own world and don’t know ours at all. It is not just that they don’t know it, but that they 
don’t want to [know it]. They don’t even try. (B). 
Bezpredel as used by these Ukrainian citizens is more diffuse than corruption. Here, corruption 
is using the deputy’s mandate and the prerogatives of office for material gain, but bezpredel is 
about general disregard for the formal rules and laws of society and its moral codes, and is 
linked to a sense of impunity deriving from one’s status as a deputy. For participants, it was a 
painful irony that deputies were elected by them and entrusted with representing their interests 
(however these might be understood) and making (or at least assenting to) laws that apply to 
all, but instead they advanced personal or mercantile claims and disregarded the very laws they 
made. It is this understanding of the representative relationship that lies at the root of the 
revulsion and estrangement felt by participants. Therefore, representation was most freely 
conceived as a zero-sum game, which according to Saward (2010, 2) “can readily lead to 
condemnation of representative government and politics”. However, in this data such a 
conception of representation did not lead to a disavowal of representative government in 
general, in the sense of diffuse support. Rather the opposite was found: the participants were 
“critical citizens” (Norris 1999) whose scepticism for the democratic practices in their country 
coexisted with faith in representative government and democratic institutions, with levels of 






Deputies’ spectacular and routinised protests clearly contributed to citizens’ low opinion of 
parliament, but at the same time it is far from the most salient factor shaping their perceptions. 
Much more significant are concerns about corruption, particularly the role of FIGs and of 
deputies’ rapacious and lawless behaviour within and beyond the walls of the Rada. Disruptive 
protests were, for participants, inauthentic and mainly utilised as part of a repertoire of practices 
for fulfilling FIGs’ or personal ends, that were categorised as pokazukha (for show) or 
zakazukha (ordered window-dressing). However, a minority of participants saw some 
individual spectacular disruptions during Yanukovych’s presidency as authentic attempts by 
the opposition to resist authoritarian domination. This tentatively confirms the initial 
proposition that disruptive protests evoke the support of core constituents, but repel wider 
audiences. Those participants who found aspects of protest justified were all individuals who 
had participated in street protests during Maidan. On one level this is logical – these citizens 
are likely to have a wider conception of the repertoire of legitimate means of claim-making. At 
the same time, the acceptance of some of deputies’ unorthodox methods of claim-making 
suggests some (albeit transient and partial) trust in deputies as representatives and in the 
political process. The relationship between political support and mobilisation is a contested 
one, but disaffection can prompt political action in some and disengagement in others (Easton 
1965, cited in Norris 1999, 25). 
 
The findings cautiously reinforce those of Collins and Gambrell (2017) whose study of 
Kyrgyzstan suggested that citizens expect democracy to be an improvement over corrupt 
hybrid or authoritarian regimes, and thus where they are concerned about corruption, this leads 
to both distrust in particular institutions (such as parliament) as well as higher support for 
democracy in the abstract. Tentatively, I can also suggest that Ukrainian citizens construct a 
spectrum where representation and corruption are in an inverse relationship and expect greater 
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democracy to reduce corruption and enhance representation. More research in Ukraine would 
be need to confirm these claims, using a larger data set that more fully reflected Ukraine’s 
diversity and that explicitly probed the depth of support for substantive elements of democracy 
such as respect for minority rights. 
Perceptions of corruption, self-serving behaviour and bezpredel appear to be the main drivers 
of the exceptionally low confidence in Ukraine’s parliament. Although trust is normally 
regarded as positive for democracy, in the face of accumulated evidence of venal and lawless 
behaviour, such distrust is rational (Norris 2011, 20) and reflects the low source credibility of 
deputies. The findings flesh out the underlying perceptions of Ukraine’s extraordinary gulf 
between citizens assessments of the regime’s performance and their democratic aspirations 
(Norris 2011, 111). Unpacking the facets of this chasm helps explain Ukrainian citizens’ 
overwhelming rejection of their political elite embodied in the election of comedian 
Volodymyr Zelenskiy as president.  
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1 See Saward (2010) for elaboration of the helpful distinction between constituents and audience in 
representation. 
2 Democratic Initiatives Foundation (2013) 2013-y: politychni pidumky i prohnozy (zahal’nonatsional’ne i 
ekspertne opytuvannia) https://dif.org.ua/article/2013-y-politichni-pidsumki-i-prognozi-zagalnonatsionalne-y-
ekspertne-opituvannya (2016), and 2016-y: Politichni pidsumky – zahal’nonatsional’ne opytuvannia, 
www.dif.org.ua/article/2016-y-politichni-pidsumki-zagalnonationalne-opytuvannya.  
3 Here I’m talking about the ‘trust’ rating (as opposed to ‘trust’ + ‘mostly trust’). 
4 World Values Survey (data from 2011) placed Ukrainians with the lowest confidence levels in parliament in 
the post-Soviet space (-59.1). The next lowest were Armenia (-44.4), Georgia (-36.6) and Russia (-28). Author’s 
calculations from Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. 
Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.) 2014.  
5 Author’s calculations from Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. 
Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.). 2014. NB. World Values Surveys ask about ‘confidence’ in 
parliament, rather than trust, but Easton (1975, p.449) uses these terms interchangeably.    
6 Agency of Legislative Initiatives (2010), ‘Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine: Small Trust in Big Powers’, report.  
7 For a more detailed overview, see AUTHOR 2019.  
8 Interviews with deputies, including Andriy Parubiy June 11 2013; Volodymyr Yavorivskyi June 5 2013 and 
Leonid Emets, May 23 2013.  
9 Coverage was variable. For example, on February 7 2012, a ‘Free Yulia’ protest that forced Yanukovych to quit 
the chamber unable to his deliver his planned speech was ignored in Holos Ukrainy’s detailed coverage of the 
session (February 8 2012), but was shown at least on the TV channels Rada, 112, 5Channel, 1+1.  
10 In brackets is the name of the main ‘oligarch’ or FIG controlling the channel as of June 2013. Ryabinska 2017, 




11 Focus groups were organised by four existing contacts in Kyiv. Participants were initially invited verbally to 
participate by my contact, who in each case was a person well-known to them. Focus groups took place on a 
voluntary, unpaid basis.I moderated the discussions in Russian and participants spoke Russian and/or Ukrainian 
according to preference. Group A was held in English, although some Ukrainian was spoken. A consent form at 
the outset asked participants whether and how they voted in the 2014 parliamentary elections. I did not collect 
data about ethnicity, though all participants were Ukrainian citizens and over half were originally from Kyiv or 
Kyiv region, with others coming from all over Ukraine, including one internally displaced by the war in Donbas.  
A majority (17/28) of participants (mainly) used Russian language. However, it is worth noting the cross-cutting 
and blurred nature of ethnicity, language use and political affiliation encountered. For example, two who chose 
to mention that in Soviet times they self-designated as Russian (group B) were enthusiastic participants in the 
Euromaidan Revolution, while other Russian speakers voted for L’viv-based Samopomich and radical right party 
Svoboda in 2014. Furthermore, two of the more politically informed participants mis-remembered whom they 
voted for in that election, mentioning previous or subsequent incarnations of parties. This draws attention to 
the extremely tenuous nature of party affiliation in Ukraine, which is complicated by parties’ short lifespans (see 
Rybiy 2013) and the fact that the parties who did well in 2014 were almost exclusively new formations. 
12 For instance, WVS data shows almost identical levels of confidence in parliament in men and women in 
Ukraine (2.1% have ‘a great deal’, while 18.3% of men and 18.4% of women have ‘quite a lot’). Author’s 
calculations from Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. 
Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.) 2014.  
13 For the period from February 2012, see Akademiya Ukrains’koi Presy reports: Monitorinh politychnykh 
novyn: osnovni rezul’taty, http://www.aup.com.ua/en/results-of-researches-2/.  
14 However, conclusions about group A’s general levels of awareness cannot be drawn given the relative youth 
of the group.  
15 For example, on May 15 2013 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YLY3mrsru90&feature=youtu.be. 
Accessed December 20 2018.  
16 These data are regrettably impressionistic, but internet searches found clips from Poroshenko’s 5Channel of 





channel. Expert interviewees often commented on the limited or unbalanced media coverage of the 
opposition at this time (Interviews with Oleksiy Haran’, July 24 2012; Edward Rakhimkulov , July 23 2012; 
Serhiy Taran’, June 24 2013).  
17 Akademiya Ukrains’koi Presy reports: Monitorinh politychnykh novyn: osnovni rezul’taty sichen’ 2013 
http://www.aup.com.ua/upload/136031585213.pdf , liutiy 2013 
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19 Interview with Andriy Parubiy, June 3 2013.  
20 A criminal case was opened against Andriy Parubiy for throwing smoke-bombs. It was later dropped due to 
deputies’ immunity from prosecution.  
21 According to a representative survey conducted February 28 – March 6 2013, 55.4% of citizens supported 
blocking parliamentary sessions to demand deputies’ personal voting. Razumkov Centre, Dumka hromadian 
Ukrainy pro situatsiiiu v kraini, otsinky diial’nosti vlady ta opozytsii, electoral’ni orientatsii, Kyiv, 2013.  
22 E.g. Olga, 48 (B) stated, “At that moment we were convinced these people … could lead the country forward. 
… Back then we believed in them”.  
23 Interviews in Kyiv at the time with experts concurred: Hanna Hopko, June 25 2013; Ihor Zhdanov, June 26 
2013; Ihor Koliushko, June 21 2013; Ihor Kohut’, June 22 2013.  
24 E.g. on February 7 2012, he was forced to wait at the podium for 5 minutes and eventually quit the chamber 
unable to make his speech. See the report on Channel5: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vhJ1Q0Gp94o. 
Accessed December 20 2018.  
25 This slang Russian word is an amalgam of zakaz, an order, and pokazukha, window-dressing or for show.  
26 Ukrains’ka Pravda, October 11 2017 https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2017/10/11/7157940/, August 1 
2018 https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2018/08/1/7187933/.  
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claim-making on behalf of one’s own or a FIG’s interests. 
29 Agency of Legislative Initiatives (2010), ‘Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine: Small Trust in Big Powers’, report. The 
report provides a breakdown of responses by occupation, region and age, but not gender. Although levels of 
trust in parliament did not vary by gender in Ukraine (according to World Values Survey data, see above), 
there is evidence that globally women perceive corruption to be more acute than men (Swarmy et al. 2000), so 
it is important to note that in the focus groups there did not seem to be any gender difference in the extent to 
which they spoke about corruption and bezpredel in their assessments of parliament.  
30 This theme came out most strongly in focus group D, where both male and female participants spoke at 
length about their experiences with electoral bribery. 
31 NB. the participants who lambasted deputies for not speaking Ukrainian in parliament were overwhelmingly 
Russophone and chose to speak Russian during the focus group.  
32 Finifter cited in Easton 1975, 456. 
33 Some deputies concurred. E.g. Andriy Pyshnyi (Fatherland) felt that the violent behaviour of some PRU 
deputies was a sign of their “lack of culture, poor upbringing”. Interview, June 11 2013. 
34 In a representative nationwide survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre and Democratic Initiatives 
Foundation in December 2012, 87.6% of respondents thought deputies should be deprived of their mandate 















Table 1: To what extent do you trust the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine?  
 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Trust 3.3 2.4 1.0 0.5 
Mostly Trust 17.6 28.7 9.4 11.4 
Mostly Distrust 35.6 21.0 33.2 40.7 
Distrust 39.1 26.5 50.6 40.4 
Source: Ivan Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (2013) 2013-y: politychni pidumky i prohnozy 
(zahal’nonatsional’ne I ekspertne opytuvannia) https://dif.org.ua/article/2013-y-politichni-pidsumki-
i-prognozi-zagalnonatsionalne-y-ekspertne-opituvannya, (2014) Hromads’ka dumka: pidsumky 2014 
roku, https://dif.org.ua/article/gromadska-dumka-pidsumki-2014-roku, (2015) 2015-i: politychni 
pidsumky – dumka naselennia, https://dif.org.ua/article/2015-y-politichni-pidsumki-dumka-















A 8 MA students at prestigious 
university 
21-25 7 females; 1 
male 
5/8 voted 
B 4 Staff at a beauty salon 46-54 4 females 3/4 voted 
C 5 Friendship group of professionals 
(engineer, IT specialist, scientist, 
two in publishing) 
37-58 3 males; 2 
females 
4/5 voted 
D 11 Staff at SME manufacturing 
consumer goods 



















Appendix 1: Question guide for focus groups 
1. Please introduce yourself to the rest of the group.  Could you give your first name or a 
pseudonym, job and say if you voted in the 2014 parliamentary elections? 
2. When you hear the words ‘Verkhovna Rada’ what is the first thing you think of? (Why?) 
3. In what ways is the Verkhovna Rada important for Ukraine’s political system? 
4. How has the Verkhovna Rada changed since the ‘Revolution of Dignity’? 
5. Sometimes MPs hold protests in the Verkhovna Rada. I want to ask your opinion about these.  
5a) In 2013, the UDAR and Batkivshchina factions blocked the tribune and stopped the work of 
parliament for over a month as part of the campaign to make deputies all vote personally. [Show 
photo] Did you hear about this protest? What do you think about this protest?  (Do you think it was 
justifiable? Why?) 
5b) In May 2016, the Radical Party blocked the Verkhovna Rada tribune for two weeks demanding 
the creation of a special commission into the offshore accounts of those in power. [Show photo] Did 
you hear about this protest?  What do you think about this protest? 
5c) In the last parliament, whenever deputies spoke in Russian, Svoboda deputies used to chant 
‘[Speak] Ukrainian’. Did you hear about this protest? What did you think about this?  
5d) I’m going to show you a clip of a recent visit of President Poroshenko to the Verkhovna Rada 
when Yuriy Lutsenko was appointed Procurator General through a controversial procedure.  Did you 
hear about this protest? What did you think about this? [Show clip] 
5e) I’m going to show another clip where damage was done to the microphones and parliamentary 
voting system. [Show: clip of the ratification of the Kharkhiv Accords]. Did you hear about this 
protest? What did you think about this? 
5f) Finally, there are times when deputies, male and female, become violent towards each other 
during plenary sessions. Did you hear about this? What do you think about this?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
